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Abstract
We look at the optimal sequential job search strategy of an individual who
faces a threshold wage constraint. We consider a model with two inter-linked
frictional markets where obtaining a threshold wage in the labour market
is a pre-condition for entry in a second market - here, marriage. We fully
characterise the reservation wage function and point out an interesting (and
robust) non-monotonicity property.
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1 Introduction
The standard sequential job search problem looks at the optimal reservation
wage under the assumption that accepted wages have no impact outside the
labour market.1 Sometimes however, job search in a frictional labour market
may be a¤ected by wage-related constraints outside this market. In some
cases, obtaining a threshold wage may be a pre-condition for entry into a
second - possibly frictional - market. For example, single individuals may
need to nd good enough jobs before they can consider nding a partner and
getting married. In some other cases, the threshold wage may simply be a
constraint imposed outside the labour market. One can think of mortgages
that are conditional on various income levels.
In this paper we ask what is the e¤ect of such constraints on the optimal
sequential job search behaviour. In order to fully characterise the reservation
wage strategy and establish the robustness of its properties, we rst consider
an example with two inter-linked frictional markets (labour and marriage).
Then we discuss what happens if frictions in the second market vanish or if
the utility from entry in the second market is large.
2 Setup
The economy consists of three types of agents: women, men and rms, all
risk neutral. Time is continuous and agents discount the future at common
discount rate r.
Men enter the market unemployed and single and use costless random
sequential search to locate rms. Contact with a rm occurs at rate 0 and
the (exogenous) distribution of wages o¤ered is denoted by F (w), continuous
on the interval [w; w]. When employed at wage w and single, a man has ow
payo¤ w.
Single employed men also look for potential partners, and know the
extent to which women are selective about whom they marry. In particular,
assume that women only marry men who earn wages at least as high as T > 0
(the threshold wage), and that they do not marry unemployed.2 A single
employed man meets a single woman at rate . A married man earning wage
w enjoys ow payo¤ w+ y, where y > 0 captures the non-material utility of
love. There is no on-the-job search and both women and men are faithful
(no on-the-marriage search), so no divorce either. Singles and couples alike
leave the economy at an exogenous rate .
1See McCall (1970)
2An assumption for now, shown to be true in equilibrium.
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3 The reservation wage function
Overall, a man can be in one of three states: unemployed, employed at wage
w and single (S), or earning a wage w and married (M). Denote his value of
being unemployed by U and let VS(w) describe the value of being single and
earning a wage w. Then, usual arguments imply that the Bellman equation
solves
(r + )U = 0
wZ
w
max [VS(w)  U; 0] dF (w)
Sequential search and the fact that utilities are increasing in wages im-
ply that the optimal strategy for an unemployed has the reservation wage
property: men only accept jobs with wage w  R. They choose R in the
knowledge that women require T in the marriage market, rejecting men who
earn wage w < T . Anticipating that VS(w) is not a continuous function (see
below), the reservation wage R can thus be dened as
R = minfw : VS(w)  Ug
With no divorce, the value of being married and earning a wage w is
VM (w) =
w + y
r +  .
Given T , we have
VS(w) =
 w
r +  if w < T
w
r +  +

(r +  + )(r + )y if w  T

: (1)
Let R denote the reservation wage of men in a pure labour market equi-
librium when the marriage market is irrelevant from the point of view of
men. R is dened as the (unique) solution to
R =
0
r + 
Z w
R
[1  F (w)] dw:
This is the lowest reservation wage R and it results under two scenarios.
First, for T < R, women marry anybody (T is very low) and hence men
dont need to worry about their marriage prospects. In contrast, for T > w,
the threshold T is so high that women turn down everybody, and hence men
are left to focus entirely on the labour market. Consequently, in both cases
the optimal reservation wage is R.
Dene bT (derived below) as the highest threshold wage for which R(T ) =
T . Assume for now (to be conrmed later), that bT 2 [R;w). This implies
the existence of two regions:
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(a) For T 2 ( bT ;w], we have R < T .
In this region, mens reservation wage strategy implies U = VS(R) =
R
r+ (<
T
r+ here). For a given T , and using VS(w) from (1) we have
R = 0
TZ
R

w
r + 
  R
r + 

dF (w)+0
wZ
T

w
r + 
+

(r +  + )(r + )
y   R
r + 

dF (w);
or
R =
0
r + 
wZ
R
[w  R] dF (w) + 0
(r + )
wZ
T
y
(r +  + )
dF (w):
The rst part on the right hand side is the standard expected wage gain
from continued search. The second part captures the additional expected
utility gain from having a wage that allows a man to get married.
Integration by parts of the rst integral and simplication of the second
imply
R =
0
r + 
24 wZ
R
[1  F (w)] dw +  [1  F (T )]
(r +  + )
y
35 : (2)
Again, the rst term on the right hand side is standard: the reservation
wage must compensate for the loss of the option of continued search for
better wages. The second term relates to the mans marriage option. The
possibility of contacting a rm (at rate 0) that o¤ers a marriageable wage
w > T (which happens with probability 1 F (T )), and subsequently meeting
a woman (at rate ) would leave him enjoying ow value y. If a worker were
to accept a wage w < T , he would be giving up the option of happiness
through marriage. Consequently, the reservation wage must compensate for
this loss.
Please note that
@R(T )
@T
=
0
@F (T )
@T y
 (r +  + )(r +  + 0) + F (R)0(r +  + ) < 0
and
@2R(T )
@T 2
=
@2F (T )
@T 2
[r +  + 0(1  F (R))]2 (r +  + )0y + 20
h
@F (T )
@T
i2
@F (R)
@R y
(r +  + )2 [r +  + 0(1  F (R))]3
7 0
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Using (2), bT as dened above is the solution to
bT = 0
r + 
24Z wbT [1  F (w)] +

h
1  F ( bT )i
r +  + 
y
35 (3)
From here, bR = bT is the reservation wage that matches T so that all
employed men are eligible to marry once they nd a woman. Clearly, bR > R.
(b) For T 2 [R; bT ], we have R = T .
For T in this region, a reservation wage R < T (and therefore with
U < Tr+ ) is no longer optimal. We need to consider a reservation wage
R = T , where U  Tr+ . Now, it must be the case that U < VS(T ) because
R is not obtained from U = VS(R). Therefore, men will use a reservation
wage R = T if and only if
T
r + 
 U  T
r + 
+
y [1  F (T )]
(r + )(r +  + )
= VS(T )
In principle, one could also consider R > T , but this is not optimal: if
R was higher than T , that would mean R = R, as men would ignore the
marriage market. However, this would be a contradiction for T > R.
Throughout, we assumed that women dont marry unemployed men. If
they did - since there is no divorce, a mans reservation wage would drop to
R. Thus, marrying an unemployed is inconsistent with only accepting men
earning w > T > R.
The above provides a full characterisation of the optimal search strategy
in the presence of a wage-related constraint T . The reservation wage function
exhibits an interesting non-monotonicity property, described and explained
as follows:
Starting from T = R, as women become more selective in the marriage
market (T increases), men also become more selective in the labour market:
they need to earn a high wage in order to become attractive marriage part-
ners, and will not accept anything less. In this range, given a relatively low
threshold wage, any wage w < T not only precludes marriage but is also too
low - men will reject it.
The feedback, however, is non-monotonic. For higher values of T , the
relationship changes. At some point (bT ), a wage w < T can still be high
enough so that men accept it even if it precludes marriage. From here on, as
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women become even more selective, males tend to gradually give up on the
marriage market. This is simply because they nd it increasingly di¢ cult
to encounter wages that attract women. As a consequence, the reservation
wages in the labour market gradually fall, to the point where men give up
completely.
The above results have been obtained within a framework where both
markets are frictional, and for a given y. How robust (general) is this non-
monotonicity property? First, is it dependent on the existence of frictions
in the second market? Second, recall that the ow value y constitutes the
link between the two markets which ensures that the job searchers would in
principle like to gain entry into the second market. Can R < T be still part
of the optimal reservation wage strategy if this utility is very large?
To answer the rst question, note that for an unemployed man the dis-
counted expected utility of marriage is 0[1 F (T )](r++) y. It is easy to see that,
even if  tends to1, the value attached to the option of marriage is bounded
as long as y <1. This is because, before even contemplating marriage, an
unemployed must nd a job rst.3 What this means is that the wage-related
constraint will always inuence job search behaviour, with or without fric-
tions in the second market.
Furthermore, recall that bT (y) is
bT = 0
r + 
264 wZ
bT
[1  F (w)] dw +

h
1  F ( bT )i
(r +  + )
y
375 :
It is straightforward to see that for y = 0, this gives bT = R. We can
rewrite the above as
y =
(r +  + )
"bT (r + )  0 wRbT [1  F (w)]dw
#
0
h
 1 + F ( bT )i ;
so limbT!wy =1 (as the limit of the numerator is a positive constant, while
the limit of the denominator is zero). Since bT is an invertible function,
it follows that lim
y!1
bT = w. The range with R < T exists as long as y is
bounded.
3Conversely, this value is innite for y =1, even if  <1.
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Finally,
@ bT
@y
=
0
h
1  F ( bT )i
(r +  + )
n
r +  + 0
h
1  F ( bT )io+ 0dF (bT )
dbT y
> 0;
which is positive since @F (
bT )
@ bT > 0.
The ndings are summarised in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 For any y bounded, we have bT 2 (R;w) with @ bT@y > 0 and
(i) R = R for T  R and T  w;
(ii) R = T for T 2 (R; bT ];
(iii) R < T for T 2 ( bT ;w) with @R@T < 0 and @R@y > 0:
Observe that although @R@y = 0 in (ii), the marriage market nevertheless
a¤ects the labour market (as R = T ). Furthermore, please note that the
wage distribution F (w) impacts on the reservation wage only in the R < T
section.
Figure 1 illustrates our results.4
FIGURE 1 here.
4 Discussion
We have investigated the e¤ect of a wage-related constraint in one market
(e.g. marriage) on the optimal job search strategy in the labour market. We
have shown that the reservation wage function is non-monotonic. Intuitively,
this is because with two inter-linked markets, wages play a dual role: they
provide income from employment and allow (or not) access to the second
market. If the constraint is relatively low, the reservation wage will match
it; if the constraint is high, a relatively high wage could now be acceptable
even if it precludes entry to the other market.
4For a given y and with F uniform.
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There will always be a range of threshold wages (T ) for which the optimal
reservation wage R is lower than T . When this is the case, the reservation
wage will decrease for T higher and higher, because job searchers will nd it
harder and harder to encounter high enough wages, so they gradually give
up on the second market. Of course, the rate at which this happens depends
on the actual shape of the wage distribution. Indeed, recall that @
2R(T )
@T 2
7 0.
For convenience, we illustrated the case with an uniform distribution (so the
R < T range was convex). Alternatively, with F normal, the R < T range
starts o¤ being concave then turns convex. Furthermore, if the threshold
wage T was not unique (possibly distributed over a continuum of values),
that would also a¤ect the rate at which R decreases with T .
The non-monotonicity property of the reservation wage function is robust
in two ways. First, it does not rely on the existence of frictions in the second
market - all that matters is that there is a wage-related constraint linked to
this market (indeed, the threshold wage itself could be either exogenous or
endogenous). Secondly, the non-monotonicity property holds as long as the
utility from entry to the second market is bounded.
As a consequence, the reservation wage function of a constrained sequen-
tial job search problem can be applied to various models that explore the
interaction between a frictional market and an other (possibly frictional)
market.5
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